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MARKETS-AS-NETWORKS
THEORY: A REVIEW
Filipe J. Sousa
ABSTRACT
This paper exposes the development of markets-as-networks theory from
formal inception in the mid-1970s until 2010 state-of-the-art, en route
presenting its historical roots. This largely European-based theory
challenges the conventional, dichotomous view of the business world as
including ﬁrms and markets, arguing for the existence of relational
governance structures (the so-called ‘‘interﬁrm cooperation’’) in addition
to hierarchical and transactional ones.
1. INTRODUCTION
The ‘‘Industrial and Marketing Purchasing Group’’ (or ‘‘IMP Group,’’
henceforth IMP) is the most prominent worldwide research community
dedicated to the study of vertical cooperative linkages – so-called business
relationships – established, developed, and maintained between ﬁrms in
the business world. The origins of IMP, according to one of its founding
fathers (Cunningham, 1980), can be traced back to the mid-1970s when
several junior marketing researchers – from France (Jean Paul Valla and
Michel Perrin, Institut de Recherche de l’Entreprise in Lyon), Germany
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(Michael Kutschker, University of Munich), Italy (Ivan Snehota, Isvor-Fiat
Institute in Turin), Sweden (Hakan Hakansson, Lars Hallen, Jan Johanson
and Bjorn Wootz, University of Uppsala), and the United Kingdom
(Malcolm Cunningham, Elling House, and Peter Turnbull, University of
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology and David Ford,
University of Bath) – dissatisﬁed with the explanatory power of marketing
theory (deeply rooted in microeconomics), started to challenge the
conventional view of (both atomistic and faceless) business-to-business
(B2B) markets with the empirical ﬁndings of research undertaken in Europe.
Some seminal contributions can be identiﬁed, for instance, Blois (1972),
Ford (1978), Hakansson (1975), Mattsson (1973), among others. IMP
currently comprises more than 300 scholars and researchers mostly
from Europe, but also from Australia, Japan, and the United States of
America. Hakansson and Snehota’s (2000, p. 35) characterization of IMP
is insightful: ‘‘The IMP is a prime example of what it is also studying – a
ﬂexible network organization with ﬂoating boundaries but built around
some strong relationships that connect and permit cross-fertilisation of
various streams of ideas and research.’’ IMP’s main discussion fora are
its annual conferences, held since 1984. For more details, see the website
http://www.impgroup.org.
The extensive conceptual and empirical body of knowledge developed
by IMP members over the last four decades draws upon many analytical
frameworks and theories – for instance, social exchange theory (Blau, 1964),
interorganizational theory (Negandhi, 1975), relational contracting theory
(Macneil, 1980), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978),
organizational theory (March & Simon, 1958), or even transaction cost
economics (Williamson, 1985), just to mention a few.
Whenever discussing or reviewing this 40-year-old body of knowledge,
many scholars and researchers diverge with regard to its denomination:
whereas some call it ‘‘an approach’’ (Hakansson, 1987) or ‘‘a paradigm’’
(Easton, 1992), others see it as ‘‘an European-based research tradition’’
(Johanson & Mattsson, 1994), ‘‘a school of thought’’ (Araujo & Easton,
1996), ‘‘a perspective’’ (Turnbull, Ford, & Cunningham, 1996), or a relatively
new ‘‘theoretical territory’’ in the marketing landscape (Easton & Hakansson,
1996). Some IMP members even take a postmodernist stance by collapsing
this body of knowledge into the IMP itself, strangely confusing the former
with ‘‘a social enterprise’’ (Axelsson, 1992b) or ‘‘a social grouping’’ sharing
similar interests and assumptions (Easton & Araujo, 1989).
In contrast to these varying terminologies (and positions), the author
explicitly contends that this body of knowledge constitutes as a whole a
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theory, namely the so-called markets-as-networks theory (henceforth
‘‘MAN theory’’), also often referred to as industrial networks theory.
The author argues that the body of knowledge produced by the IMP is
a ‘‘theoretical system of constructs and variables’’ (e.g., ‘‘actor,’’ ‘‘adapta-
tion,’’ ‘‘net,’’ and so forth), ‘‘linked by propositions and hypotheses’’ (e.g.,
concerning ‘‘the existence, connectedness, and uniqueness of business
relationships in the business world’’). Accordingly, this body of knowledge
constitutes a theory – at least if one adopts Bacharach’s (1989) robust
deﬁnition of ‘‘theory.’’ The recognition of a full-ﬂedged MAN theory
(cf. Hakansson & Snehota, 2000, p. 46) is shared – at least implicitly – by
many IMP members (see, e.g., McLoughlin & Horan, 2002; Moller &
Halinen, 1999). The difﬁculty to acknowledge the existence of a holistic
theory of B2B markets is probably related to, as Melin (1989) stresses, the
need for that theory to address the multiple ambiguities observed in business
relationships and networks (e.g., coexistence of cooperation and conﬂict and
of stability and change within the same business relationship). As Easton
(1992) argues, MAN theory handles quite well both the inconsistency and
complexity inherent in business relationships and markets.
MAN theory tentatively describes and explains the inner workings of
business networks and the vertical cooperative relationships between ﬁrms
that these networks include. The ‘‘interaction,’’ ‘‘relationship,’’ and ‘‘net-
work’’ are the theory’s main units of analysis (Easton & Hakansson, 1996).
Manifold MAN theory features at least three major conceptual cornerstones:
the existence, connectedness, and uniqueness of business relationships
(Ford, 1980); business relationships as a third type of governance structure,
alternative to both hierarchies and markets (Richardson, 1972); and the
signiﬁcance of business relationships to the ﬁrm (Johanson & Mattsson,
1987) – the potential causes bringing about ‘‘relationship signiﬁcance’’ are
addressed in detail by Sousa and Castro (this volume).
To the best of the author’s knowledge, MAN theory is not yet subject to a
solid articulation and explicit codiﬁcation – even when one acknowledges
the ﬁrst attempts of some MAN theorists (e.g., Johanson & Mattsson, 1994;
McLoughlin & Horan, 2000a; Ritter & Gemunden, 2003a; Turnbull et al.,
1996). This paper thus attempts to ﬁll a conceptual gap in the related MAN
literature.
Section 2 presents the historical roots of MAN theory, going back to
the seminal works of Smith, Young, and Richardson who paved the ground
for the subsequent analytical and empirical research. The theoretical
development process as well as the dissemination and largely descriptive
character of the theory are described in Section 3. MAN theory’s current
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state-of-the-art, basically the postulated network view of the business world,
is presented in Section 4.
2. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF MAN THEORY
Although MAN theory ﬂourishes from the 1970s onward (mostly owing to
the proliﬁc research of the IMP), the deepest of its roots can be traced back
to the seminal works of Adam Smith (1776 [1999]), Allyn Young (1928), and
George B. Richardson (1972) who lay (in this chronological order) some of
the theory’s primordial foundations.
2.1. Division of Labor Within and Among Firms: Smith
and Young on Specialization and Integration
Smith’s pioneering inquiry leads him to conclude that the division of labor,
that is, the separation of complex work (performed by a single worker)
in a multitude of simpler tasks (in the hands of different workers), is
the key factor in the economic development of any country. Division of
labor necessarily gives rise to substantial increases in the productivity of
a country’s varied ‘‘trades’’ and ‘‘businesses’’ – in Smith’s 18th century
terminology. Such positive effects – in the form of a greater output of work
and/or reductions in productive costs (i.e., scale economies) – are brought
about by two factors: ﬁrst, the increasing dexterity, efﬁcacy, and efﬁciency
of workers in the (repeated) performance of speciﬁc tasks over time; and
second, technological innovations (e.g., time-saving and high-throughput
machinery) often introduced by machinery producers but on occasion
devised by inventors or even common factory workers (Smith, 1776 [1999],
pp. 112–125).
Smith asserts that the division of labor is not the aftermath of human
wisdom but results instead from the ‘‘[human] power of, and disposition to
exchange one thing for another’’ (p. 117). Individuals ﬁnd to own advantage
to ﬁrst, concentrate on what are capable of producing and then, exchange
the surplus of production (above consumption needs) for what one needs
or wants, that is to say, the product of other individuals’ labor. Human
self-interest does not preclude exchanges; on the contrary, self-interest
contributes heavily to the engagement in mutually agreed exchanges, for
(more or less) dissimilar outcomes of one’s labor are of use to someone else
(p. 119).
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Smith therefore argues, in opposition to previously thought, that the
notorious inequality concerning human ‘‘talents’’ and ‘‘geniuses’’ is not the
primary cause of division of labor. That inequality, Smith claims, is likely to
be more of an effect than a cause of division of labor and tends to widen
over time as the division of labor increases (p. 120). Division of labor has
hence an important role in reinforcing specialisms – specialisms that, as one
knows, in part also bring about the division of labor.
Smith therefore derives the well-known theorem that the degree to which
division of labor is effected is limited by the extent of the market (i.e., overall
demand for products resulting from individuals undertaking subdivided
tasks) (p. 121). The division of labor is likely to expand into several trades
and businesses insofar as the (consumer) market grows (driven, e.g., by
reductions in transportation costs). Smith alludes to the rise of British
commerce with both inland regions and foreign countries, by the end of the
18th century: the market grew as transportation costs decreased, mainly
owing to substitution of water carriage for land carriage (p. 123). In short,
Adam Smith’s thesis is that the division of labor (and the increasing
productivity that it gives rise to) ultimately brings about wealth – and in the
case of a fair society, wealth generated by the whole nation is in principle
distributed fairly among individual of all societal classes (p. 115).
Smith’s work is extended only more than 150 years later when Allyn
Young, a 20th century American economist, provides explanations on
‘‘increasing returns.’’ Young (1928, p. 529) starts where Smith leaves off:
unlike the trades and businesses so characteristic of the late 18th century
(on which Smith focuses), Young turns attention to the manufacturing
industries that emerged in England and in the United States at the beginning
of the 19th century with the Industrial Revolution. For Young, the division
of labor accounts for the obtainment of increasing returns and thus for
economic progress – and that increase returns and economic progress are in
turn likely to lead to a further division of labor. Young argues that the main
outcomes accruing from division of labor, namely greater productivity, are
obtained whenever high-throughput machinery is deployed in work. That is,
the principal economies obtained with the division of labor – what Young
calls ‘‘the economies of roundabout methods of production’’ – are those of
‘‘(y) using labor in roundabout or indirect ways (y)’’, for instance, as in
‘‘(y) Mr. [Henry] Ford’s [production] methods (y)’’ (pp. 530–531, 539).
The division of labor, according to Young, triggers a series of changes
(e.g., in the form of new competences, activities, products, or even new
ﬁrms and industries) that progressively propagate throughout ﬁrms and the
industries of which are a part (p. 533). In this respect, one can – as, for
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instance, Araujo and Kerndrup (2001) do – recast that series of changes
(both of a qualitative and quantitative nature) as a cascade of connected
teaching and learning processes taking place inside as well as across
corporate boundaries, considering at the same time that interﬁrm vertical
linkages (mostly business relationships) are primary platforms for effecting
such processes.
With the division of labor, internal economies of (otherwise extremely
large and multiproduct) ﬁrms give way to internal and external economies of
(specialized and single-product) ﬁrms (p. 538). As Young (p. 528) puts it,
‘‘(y) the economies of some ﬁrms (y) ﬁgure as the external economies
of other ﬁrms (y).’’ Alfred Marshall (1890 [1997]) provides a fruitful
distinction between the internal economies that the ﬁrm is able to explore
(especially when operates at a large scale, e.g., of production) and the
economies that are external to the ﬁrm. The ‘‘Marshallian’’ ﬁrm is a medium
through which (productive) economies are obtained and ‘‘transferred’’ to
the market, with those economies being in part visible in the price of
products on sale. The ﬁrm, therefore, is likely to proﬁt from own (scale and
scope) economies and from (scale and scope) economies appropriated by
connected counterparts, of the same or related industries. Young seems to
allude to the connectedness of ﬁrms and industries when claims that external
economies do not add up to – in fact are greater than – the sum of all ﬁrms’
internal economies (p. 528) and notes that the growth of some industries is
contingent on the growth of other, ancillary industries (p. 538).
Most importantly, Young argues for the division of labor to occur not
only within but also among ﬁrms and industries (p. 529). Young addresses
an important (yet usually neglected) feature of division of labor. Although
the essence of division of labor is the specialization taking place inside ﬁrms
and industries, ‘‘integration’’ (typically in form of cooperation) among
ﬁrms and industries surely follows. The specialization–integration duality
inherent in the division of labor is captured by Young’s (p. 538) instructive
outlook on industries: ‘‘It is sufﬁciently obvious (y) that over a large part
of the ﬁeld of industry an increasingly intricate nexus of [highly] specialised
undertakings has inserted itself between the producer of raw materials and
the consumer of the ﬁnal product.’’ Even Adam Smith (1776 [1999],
pp. 116–117) apparently refers to that concomitant integration when says
that ﬁnal products are the joint outcomes of a diversity of (interrelated)
labor endeavors. Piore (1992), however, is probably the ﬁrst scholar to list
explicitly corporate specialization and integration (i.e., interﬁrm coopera-
tion) as indissociable characteristics of the division of labor. To the
(increasing) division and subdivision of activities, one often replies with
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(increasing) attempts to integrate activity outcomes. Patterns of integration
and ‘‘disintegration’’ taking place over time (especially at a vertical level,
i.e., within arm’s-length relations and/or business relationships between
buyers and sellers) are described and justiﬁed at length, for instance, by
Langlois and Robertson (1995).
Main effects of specialization and integration can be summarized as
follows: the former brings about (i) a higher productive efﬁciency of the ﬁrm
(Marshall, 1890 [1997]; Young, 1928), (ii) the potential enhancement of
existing corporate competences or development of new ones (Richardson,
1972), and (iii) innovation (e.g., new attributes of or uses for corporate
resources) (Penrose, 1959); the latter, on the other hand, results in a higher
efﬁciency (with respect to the ﬁrm’s costs of transacting or interacting with
counterparts, via arm’s-length relations and business relationships, respec-
tively) (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995; Williamson, 1979) and allows the ﬁrm
to access and explore external, complementary resources and competences
(Hakansson & Snehota, 1989).
Finally, one needs to recognize that integration is also found within the
ﬁrm, for the interdependence between ﬁrm’s departments, divisions, and
activities grows and strengthens over time as specialization is underway
within corporate boundaries (Piore, 1992). Young (p. 539) makes the same
point on ﬁrm’s (internal) interdependence: ‘‘What is required is that
industrial operations be seen as an interrelated whole.’’ Understandably, the
(corporate) whole is ‘‘greater than the sum of parts.’’
2.2. Firm, Market, and Interﬁrm Cooperation as Governance
Structures: The Richardsonian Insight
The conventional perspective of self-sufﬁcient ﬁrms only competing in
(faceless) markets is ﬁrst challenged in explicit manner almost 40 years ago.
George B. Richardson, in the 1972 path-breaking ‘‘The organisation of
industry,’’ alerts to the ‘‘highly misleading account’’ or ‘‘distorted view’’
(commonly found in standard theories of the ﬁrm and of markets)
concerning the way in which each and every industry is de facto organized
(pp. 883–884). Division of labor, according to such theories, entails the
choice between ﬁrms and markets, that is to say, between hierarchies and
arm’s-length relations established between ﬁrms, respectively. Coordination
of economic activities is effected either via ‘‘direction’’ (within ﬁrms) or
through the ‘‘invisible hand’’ (operating spontaneously between ﬁrms).
While the invisible hand of markets features prominently in Adam Smith’s
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(1776 [1999]) work, the ‘‘visible hand’’ of ﬁrms is only given emphasis in
the 20th century, for instance, by the business historian doyen Alfred
Chandler (1977).
Above-mentioned standard theories of the ﬁrm and markets, Richardson
continues, build upon a sharp ﬁrm–market dichotomy and exhibit two
deﬁciencies: ﬁrst, theories assume (yet do not account for) the principle of
the division of labor between ﬁrms and markets, that is to say, theories fall
short of explanations on which activities are coordinated by corporate
‘‘directed planning’’ and which activities are left to the ‘‘spontaneous
coordination’’ of the ‘‘price mechanism’’; and, second, theories fail to notice
a pervasive phenomena of the business world, namely ‘‘interﬁrm coopera-
tion’’ which – as Richardson claims – provides an alternative mode of
coordinating economic activities, in addition to hierarchical and market
governance structures. Richardson alludes to ‘‘(y) the ingredient of co-
operation being very commonly present, in some degree, in the relationship
between buyer and seller’’ (p. 886) as well as ‘‘(y) the dense network of
cooperation and afﬁliation by which ﬁrms are interrelated’’ (p. 883).
Richardson (1972) distinguishes clearly between interﬁrm cooperation
and pure market transactions (between ﬁrms). Cooperation in ‘‘(y)
traditional links between buyers and sellers (y) found in most markets
(y)’’ is ‘‘close, complex and ramiﬁed’’ (pp. 884, 891). In such ‘‘cooperative
arrangements’’ (p. 886), ‘‘reciprocal undertakings’’ (p. 891) or ‘‘business
relations’’ (p. 895), both parties accept the obligation of (and give implicit
assurance concerning) ﬁrms’ nonopportunistic behavior presently and in the
future. In purely transactional interﬁrm relations, on the contrary, ‘‘(y)
there is no continuing association, no give and take, but an isolated act of
purchase and sale (y)’’ (p. 891).
For Richardson, the principle governing the division of labor (or, in other
words, the coordination of economic activities in ﬁrms, markets, or interﬁrm
cooperation) can be grasped only when two elements are brought into the
forefront: corporate activities and related competences (or ‘‘capabilities’’ as
Richardson mentions). Richardson views each industry as composed of a
large number of interrelated activities (e.g., research and development,
purchasing, production, marketing, and so on). Corporate activities are only
carried out by ﬁrms endowed with appropriate competences, that is, the
know-how to do things effectively and efﬁciently (p. 888). Activities
fall under two types (pp. 888–889): ‘‘similar’’ and ‘‘complementary.’’ While
similar activities demand the same resources and competences for under-
taking, complementary activities (as a rule ‘‘dissimilar’’) represent different
stages of a productive process and need to be coordinated in level or
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speciﬁcation. Activities may even be ‘‘closely complementary’’ if mandate
both quantitative and qualitative coordination (p. 891).
Firms are necessarily devoted to a certain range or scope, undertaking
only those activities for which have the required resources and competences.
That is, ﬁrms tend to specialize in certain activities for which corporate
resources and competences (internally developed, acquired, and/or accessed
and exploited via cooperation) offer some ‘‘comparative advantage’’
(p. 891). Given the limitedness of (internal) corporate resources and
competences, it is to ﬁrms’ advantage to concentrate in (and possibly expand
into) activities which ﬁrms are in fact capable of performing. So, activities
within corporate boundaries are in general similar – this is not to say that
ﬁrms cannot produce several products and thus compete in different
product markets (pp. 888–889).
Two obstacles impede the coordination of all activities to be effected
within a single, large, and necessarily self-sufﬁcient ﬁrm. First, corporate
activities display economies (and diseconomies) of scale and scope. The scale
at which an activity is performed (i.e., the volume of output that activity
generates) affects the activity’s efﬁciency given that for the most part there
are not ‘‘constant returns to scale’’ or, in other words, there is an ‘‘optimum’’
point until which ‘‘increasing returns to scale’’ (e.g., reductions in per-unit
productive costs) are obtained and from that point onward, the ﬁrm incurs
‘‘decreasing returns to scale’’ (e.g., increases in per-unit marketing costs). For
instance, Penrose (1959) explicates in detail the limits to corporate growth
and size, pointing out ‘‘decreasing returns to management’’ and ‘‘bureau-
cratic costs’’ inter alia as explanatory factors. Second, the performance of
activities does not necessarily require similar corporate competences.
By bearing in mind these two obstacles, one can argue that Richardson
(1972, pp. 890–891) offers a competence-based answer to Ronald Coase’s
(1937) famous questions, namely ‘‘why do ﬁrms exist at all (when markets
can in principle coordinate all activities)?’’ and ‘‘why does not exist only one
extremely large ﬁrm (instead of the myriad of ﬁrms observed in the business
world)?’’. Richardson (p. 896) himself considers the ‘‘Coasian’’ explanation
on the existence of ﬁrms – that there are substantial costs of ‘‘using’’ markets
to effect the coordination of economic activities, costs that may exceed those
associated with coordination within hierarchies – to be consistent with and
providing a solid basis for own rationale (for Richardson is explicit about
factors that may affect those ‘‘relative’’ costs, of hierarchies versus markets).
However, a notorious difference between Richardson and Coase can be
found: only the former acknowledges explicitly interﬁrm cooperation as a
distinct governance structure (p. 896).
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In short, it pays off to leave the coordination of some activities –
especially complementary ones, which may be dissimilar – to the
responsibility of several ﬁrms, either resorting (as adequate) to purely
transactional relations or to lasting and complex interﬁrm cooperative
linkages. One can rely on markets’ ‘‘law of large numbers’’ – that owing to
the presence of aggregates of suppliers and customers, overall supply tends
to equal overall demand – for carrying out the qualitative coordination
of complementary activities. Dissimilar yet closely complementary (i.e.,
demand not only quantitative but also qualitative coordination), on the
other hand, need to be coordinated by interﬁrm cooperation. Richardson
(p. 892) hence arrives at the raison d’eˆtre for interﬁrm cooperation: ‘‘Here
then we have the prime reason for the existence of co-operation and
association the existence of which we noted earlier. They exist because
of the need to co-ordinate closely complementary but dissimilar activities.
This coordination cannot be left entirely to direction within ﬁrms because
the activities are dissimilar, and cannot be left to market forces in that
it requires not the balancing of the aggregate supply of something with the
aggregate demand for it but rather the matching, both qualitative and
quantitative, of individual enterprise plans.’’
Richardson’s enlightening insight is that the division of labor is effected
by one of three alternative (yet not completely distinguishable) modes of
coordinating economic activities. Richardson posits a continuum of govern-
ance structures, ranging from ﬁrms through interﬁrm cooperation to markets:
‘‘It is important, moreover, not to draw too sharp lines of distinction between
the techniques of coordination themselves. Co-operation may come close to
direction when one of the parties is clearly predominant; and some degree of
ex ante matching of plans [i.e., cooperation] is to be found in all markets in
which ﬁrms place orders in advance’’ (p. 896, emphasis in original). Finally,
Richardson makes two relevant points: ‘‘And just as the presence of
co-operation [within both interﬁrm cooperation and market transactions] is
a matter of degree [for cooperation is minimal in the latter governance
structure], so also is the sovereignty [i.e., direction] that any nominally
independent ﬁrm is able to exercise on a de facto basis (y)’’ (p. 887). With
interﬁrm cooperation on hand, ﬁrms should be no longer seen either as ‘‘(y)
islands of planned coordination in a sea of market relations (y)’’, that is, as
‘‘(y) autonomous units buying and selling at arm’s-length in markets (y)’’
(p. 883). One needs to reject unrealistic depictions of the business world such
as this: ‘‘Here and there, it is true, we have found islands of conscious power
in this ocean of unconscious co-operation, like lumps of butter coagulating in
a pail of buttermilk’’ (Robertson & Dennison, 1923, p. 73).
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3. DEVELOPMENT, DISSEMINATION,
AND ORIENTATION OF MAN THEORY
3.1. The European Alternative to the (Dominant)
American View of B2B Markets
Two research traditions can be found in the ﬁeld of industrial marketing and
purchasing. The ﬁrst research tradition, developed in America since the
1960s and still dominant in the ﬁeld, features the application – problematic,
to say the least – of ‘‘consumer marketing theory’’ in B2B settings (e.g., see
Bonoma & Zaltman, 1978; Bonoma, Zaltman, & Johnston, 1977; Nicosia &
Wind, 1977; Robinson, Faris, & Wind, 1967; Sheth, 1977; Webster & Wind,
1972a; Wind, 1978). This American view of (seller-dominated and atomistic)
B2B markets – wherein ﬁrms deploy ‘‘marketing-mix’’ parameters (namely
‘‘product,’’ ‘‘price,’’ ‘‘distribution,’’ and ‘‘promotion’’) and anonymous
buyers respond (by buying or not the products on sale) – is challenged since
the mid-1970s by another, largely European research tradition. The most
notorious offspring of the latter tradition is MAN theory.
Antecedents of MAN theory can be found in three strands of research:
ﬁrst, earlier studies in distribution channels, particularly on ‘‘power’’ and
‘‘control’’ issues between channel members (e.g., Bucklin, 1965; El-Ansary &
Stern, 1972; Rosenberg & Stern, 1970; Stern & Reve, 1980; Webster, 1976;
Wilkinson, 1976, 1973, 1979); second, studies in the ﬁrm’s internationaliza-
tion process (e.g., Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Johanson & Wiedersheim-
Paul, 1975); and ﬁnally, a vast array of studies in both ‘‘industrial
buying behavior’’ (e.g., Blois, 1970; Cunningham & Kettlewood, 1976;
Cunningham & White, 1974a, 1973; Hakansson & Wootz, 1975a, 1975b;
Jarvis & Wilcox, 1977; Johnston & Bonoma, 1981; Luffman, 1974;
Pettigrew, 1975; Sheth, 1973; Spekman & Stern, 1979; Webster, 1965;
Webster & Wind, 1972b; Wind, 1970; Woodside & Sammuel, 1981) and
‘‘industrial marketing processes’’ (e.g., Blois, 1977; Cunningham & White,
1974b; Ford, 1978; Hakansson, 1980; Hakansson, Johanson, & Wootz,
1976; Hakansson & Ostberg, 1975; Hakansson, Wootz, Andersson, &
Hangard, 1979; Mattsson, 1973; Reve & Stern, 1979; Turnbull, 1974).
MAN theorists also take advantage of (more or less) distant but
stimulating sources of ideas on interdependence and interﬁrm cooperation
(e.g., Aiken & Hage, 1968; Aldrich, 1976; Blau, 1964; Chamberlain, 1968;
Dill, 1958; Emerson, 1962; Emery & Trist, 1965; Evan, 1966; Granovetter,
1985; Jacobs, 1974; Levine & White, 1961; Lincoln, 1982; Litwak & Hylton,
1962; Macauley, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974;
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Negandhi, 1975; Phillips, 1960; Telser, 1980; Van de Ven, 1976, Van de
Ven & Koenig, 1975; Warren, 1967; Whetten & Leung, 1979). Other
inspirational fountainheads are mentioned in the overview of MAN theory’s
state-of-the-art (Section 4).
3.2. IMP1 and IMP2 Research Projects, the Interaction
Approach, and the ARA Model
MAN theory’s development parallels the qualitative research (mainly
case studies) undertaken by the IMP over the last four decades. Several
reviews on precursors, evolution, assumptions, implications, and future
agenda of MAN theory are available (see, e.g., Easton, 1992; Ford &
Hakansson, 2006b; Gemunden, 1997; Hakansson & Snehota, 2000;
Johanson & Mattsson, 1994; Mattsson, 2004; Mattsson & Johanson,
2006; Mattsson & Naert, 1985; McLoughlin & Horan, 2000a, 2002, 2000b;
Ritter & Gemunden, 2003a; Turnbull et al., 1996; Wilkinson, 2001;
Wilkinson, Morlacchi, & Young, 2005a; Young, 2002).
MAN theory’s formal genesis (as well as the creation of IMP) is traced to
1976 when the ‘‘International/Industrial Marketing and Purchasing’’ –
so-called ‘‘IMP1’’ – research project began. IMP1 is born from the
dissatisfaction of about 20 junior European scholars and researchers with
the explanatory power of marketing theory concerning industrial buying
and selling – see, for instance, Monthoux’s (1975) reasons on this matter.
Those European scholars and researchers share the conviction that
marketing theory provides a very limited (if not unrealistic) understanding
of how B2B markets really work in practice. IMP lasts 6 years during which
about one thousand buyer–seller relationships – ‘‘industrial systems’’ of
goods, within and mostly across ﬁve European countries (namely, France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK) – are inquired via structured
interviews with representatives of both suppliers and customers. IMP1’s
methodological design and ﬁndings are detailed in Cunningham (1980) and
Hallen and Johanson (1989), respectively. IMP1’s empirical and theoretical
results comprehend a large database of business relationships’ features
and in-depth case studies, and a conceptual framework referred to as ‘‘the
interaction approach’’ (Campbell, 1985; Hakansson, 1982a), respectively.
The interaction approach consubstantiates two basic empirical ﬁndings of
IMP1. First, industrial purchasing and marketing are not necessarily market
transactions (i.e., isolated events of ‘‘action’’ and ‘‘reaction,’’ respectively),
but are instead part of a lasting pattern of ‘‘interactions’’ between buyers
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and sellers (active, both). As Ford (Ford, 1984, 1980) alerts, mainstream
views of industrial marketing and purchasing as discrete events are the
natural consequence of studies (pertaining to the way ﬁrms carry out buying
episodes) being conducted independently of inquiries (about how sellers
inﬂuence buying processes to their advantage). Second, and as a consequence
of the ﬁrst research ﬁnding, B2B markets are neither faceless nor atomistic
(i.e., featuring a large number of anonymous customers and consisting of
unconnected buyers and sellers, respectively), often including close and long-
standing business relationships. ‘‘Industrial markets are characterized by
stability instead of change, long lasting relationships instead of short business
transactions and closeness instead of distance’’ (Hakansson, 1982b, p. 6).
Interdependences (among business relationships) observed in IMP1 serve
as thrust for researchers to embark on a second project, the ‘‘IMP2’’
initiated in 1986. Whereas IMP1 focuses on buyer–seller relationships
(i.e., dyads), IMP2’s primary units of analysis are the complex networks
that such relationships overall form. IMP2 is methodologically similar to
IMP1 (with intensive deployment of case research), being carried out by
researchers from Australia, Japan, and the United States, besides most of
the researchers responsible for undertaking IMP1. IMP2’s main outcomes
are a large database of buyer–seller relationships and several in-depth case
studies and, most importantly, the ‘‘Actors-Resources-Activities (ARA)
model’’ that depicts B2B markets as strongly interwoven networks of actors,
resources, and activities (Hakansson, 1989, 1987; Hakansson & Johanson,
1992) – see Section 4.4.2.
3.3. Books and Papers as Main Dissemination Vehicles of MAN Theory
MAN theory is diffused (as well as extended or even criticized and rejected)
at large via scientiﬁc journals, books and book chapters, and the
proceedings of IMP annual conferences.
Analytical and empirical results of qualitative research undertaken by
MAN theorists are featured in a multitude of papers, mostly in the
industrial marketing ﬁeld [e.g., European Journal of Marketing (EJM),
Industrial Marketing Management (IMM), International Journal of Research
in Marketing (IJRM), International Marketing Review (IMR), Journal of
Business and Industrial Marketing (JBIM), Journal of Business-to-Business
Marketing (JBBM), Journal of Marketing (JM), Journal of Marketing
Research (JMR), Journal of Marketing Management (JMM), Journal of
Strategic Marketing (JSM), Marketing Theory (MT), the recently founded
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IMP Journal, or the extinct Industrial Marketing and Purchasing], but also in
the management science area [e.g., International Business Review (IBR),
Journal of Business Research (JBR), Journal of Management Studies (JMS),
Management Learning (ML), Organization (O), Scandinavian Journal of
Management (SJM), or Strategic Management Journal (SMJ)].
Nevertheless, the major milestones in the dissemination of MAN theory
are the publication of three books: Hakansson’s (1982b) formalization of
the interaction approach, and Axelsson and Easton’s (1992) and Hakansson
and Snehota’s (1995) comprehensive introductions to MAN theory (and
B2B practice). An extensive list of other books and book chapters drawing
on or promulgating MAN theory can be identiﬁed. On books see, for
instance, Dubois (1998), Ford (2002, 1990), Ford et al. (1998), Forsgren &
Johanson (1992), Gadde and Hakansson (1993, 2001), Gemunden, Ritter,
and Walter (1997), Hakansson (1989, 1987, 1975), Hakansson, Harrison,
and Waluszewski (2004), Hakansson and Johanson (2001), Hakansson and
Waluszewski (2007), Hallen and Johanson (1989), Havila, Forsgren, and
Hakansson (2002), Laage-Hellman (1997), Lundgren (1994), Moller and
Wilson (1995), Naude and Turnbull (1998), Turnbull and Cunningham
(1981), Turnbull and Paliwoda (1986), and Turnbull and Valla (1986). As
illustrative examples of book chapters, check Araujo and Easton (1996),
Easton (2000), Ford, McDowell, and Tomkins (1996), Hakansson (1993),
Hakansson and Johanson (1988, 1984, 1993b), Hakansson and Snehota
(2000), Johanson and Mattsson (1994), and Mattsson (1985, 2004, 1987).
According to McLoughlin and Horan (2002, 2000b), MAN theorists’
preference to publish in book format is supported by three motives. First,
the thought-provoking nature of MAN theory – that by providing ‘‘a new
view of reality,’’ as Axelsson and Easton’s (1992) edited book title puts it,
challenges the orthodoxy of mainstream purchasing and marketing
theories – adds greatly to the usual difﬁculties of exposing unprecedented
ideas in a journal paper format (i.e., overcoming referees’ resistance to
novelties). Second, books have a slight advantage over journals because they
allow the dissemination of knowledge to a wider audience and make
possible the generation of dialogues with other disciplines and related
theories. Since MAN theory springs from theoretical cross-fertilization, as
MAN theorists recognize (e.g., Hakansson & Snehota, 2000; Wilkinson,
2001), it is likely that further cross-fertilization is searched for – and
cross-fertilization can be more easily achieved through books. Third, as
qualitative research (mostly case studies) is far more employed than
quantitative methods (Easton, 1995), research ﬁndings are bound to be
larger and thus unsuited to publication in the relatively restricted 8,000
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(or less) words space of a journal paper. With respect to the predominance
of qualitative research undertaken by MAN theorists, Easton (2000) argues
for the epistemological validity of case research in the inquiry of business
relationships and networks.
3.4. MAN Theory’s Largely Positive Orientation
The primary goal of MAN theory is to describe and explain the business
relationships and networks in which ﬁrms are deeply embedded. The charge
of an overly descriptive focus is usually placed on MAN theory, despite
its great explanatory power (Moller, 1994; Wensley, 1995). Another
limitation commonly pointed to MAN theory is the neglect of the ‘‘dark
side’’ of business relationships, given the excessive emphasis on relationship
‘‘functions’’ and ‘‘beneﬁts.’’ This limitation is compensated by recent work
on the ‘‘dysfunctions’’ and ‘‘sacriﬁces’’ of business relationships (e.g., see
Hakansson & Snehota, 1998).
MAN theory is inductively developed from qualitative research without
any kind of prescriptive concern (Brennan & Turnbull, 2002). Hakansson’s
(1987, p. 210) position is elucidative: ‘‘We have met many managers who
have been very skilled in their way of handling networks as a result of
experience of a life-time spent in networks. As a consequence we will avoid
giving detailed advice regarding the practical handling of networks. Instead,
we believe that we can be of much more help by identifying and discussing
more general network issues. Thus my contribution is rather to integrate
known details to a more comprehensive body of knowledge.’’
The positive orientation of MAN theory stems from two motives. First,
MAN theorists share the conviction that to improve the practice of
industrial purchasing and marketing, one needs ﬁrst of all a better under-
standing of business relationships and networks observed recurrently in B2B
markets (Wilkinson & Young, 2002). MAN theorists argue that ‘‘good’’
theory is in principle conducive to ‘‘good’’ practice. Second, the units of
analysis of (as well as the sort of research questions posed by) MAN
theorists do not to lend themselves to the issuance of managerial prescrip-
tions. As Easton and Hakansson (1996) stress, in order to be normative,
MAN theory needs to adopt a narrower perspective (e.g., by adopting the
ﬁrm as object of study).
Another difﬁculty pertains to the fact that toolkits for relationship and
network management are difﬁcult to formulate. Given that diversity is
a conspicuous feature of B2B markets (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995), ‘‘best’’
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or ‘‘optimal’’ practices are not likely to apply. ‘‘Business researchers can aim
to construct tools to help managers to understand their world, not tell them
what decisions to take or what to do. Business researchers cannot predict the
direction of development of a network, nor forecast the ﬁnal effects of any
network action. (y) [As] networks are built on variety [(e.g., of interests,
expectations, and goals)] (y) the answers to managers’ questions about
their interactions will always depend on the speciﬁc situation and context.
There are no nice neat solutions or standardized approaches to strategic
network success’’ (Hakansson & Ford, 2002, p. 138).
That description is given importance to the disfavor of prescription
(Gemunden, 1997) is not tantamount to say that MAN theory is purely
descriptive or ‘‘managerially empty’’ (Moller & Halinen, 1999). As Easton
(1992) argues, normative implications ﬂow from, but do not drive, MAN
theory.
The concern of MAN theorists with managerial guidelines is nevertheless
growing since the mid-1990s. For Ritter, Wilkinson, and Johnston (2004), a
shift – from understanding business relationships and networks to offering
advices on to how manage those intricate interﬁrm linkages – is taking place
within MAN theory. Over the last two decades, an increasing number
of works are focused on helping practitioners in relationship and network
management tasks (e.g., Ford et al., 1998; Ford & McDowell, 1999;
Moller & Svahn, 2003). This normative turn is understandable. Regardless
of the phenomenon under study, description necessarily precedes prescrip-
tion. For prescription per se is useless without some kind of previous
understanding: ‘‘One cannot choose what course of action to prescribe
without knowing what events each course of action will lead to’’ (Easton &
Hakansson, 1996, p. 409).
4. MAN THEORY’S STATE-OF-THE-ART
4.1. Development Process of Business Relationships
The development of any business relationship is a costly and time-consuming
process (Hakansson & Snehota, 2000). Business relationships are constantly
in need of investments for establishment, development, maintenance, and
even termination, thus competing for ﬁrms’ limited resources. Easton (1992)
lists two other factors that are decisive for developing business relationships:
expectations held by both parties concerning the actual or potential value
of the business relationship (i.e., whether relationship beneﬁts exceed or are
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likely to outweigh related sacriﬁces), and the existence of complementarity or
compatibility between both parties’ objectives (namely, whether each party
feels conﬁdent that the other reciprocates and is not a free-rider). Some
degree of ‘‘attraction’’ between parties also enters ﬁrms’ decision to nurture
and sustain a business relationship (Wilkinson, Young, & Freytag, 2005b) –
that attraction being a function of ﬁrms’ ‘‘attractiveness’’ to others. Mattsson
(1989) claims that the ﬁrm’s ‘‘attractiveness’’ depends not only on internal
endowments (mostly, corporate resources and competences) but also on
corporate propensity to cooperate (deduced somewhat from ﬁrm’s history
of interaction). There is a trade-off between attractiveness and freedom of
choice: in order to be attractive, the ﬁrm has in part to maintain several
business relationships and thus is likely to increase dependence on counter-
parts. ‘‘The company that possesses no relationships is theoretically free to
enter into collaboration with anyone at all, but in fact it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd
anyone who is interested. The company that has already entered into a
number of relationships will ﬁnd it much easier to interest a partner, but its
choices will be far more limited. (y) In general, established relationships are
a vital condition for the initiation of [further] successful collaboration’’
(Hakansson, 1989, p. 124).
Business relationships evolve over time as reciprocal investments are
made by parties and interdependence, and mutual trust and commitment
gradually increase. Trust, commitment, and the expectation of future
interaction go usually hand in hand: ‘‘Trust is a necessary condition for
commitment and commitment only makes sense if tomorrow matters’’
(Hakansson & Snehota, 1995, p. 198). Check, for example, Pressey and
Mathews (2004) and Wilson and Mummaleneni (1986), respectively, on
trust and commitment in business relationships. Parties’ initial reluctance
to cooperate is in part related to the uncertainty regarding counterpart’s
intents and future behavior. The ‘‘distance’’ (of a social, cultural,
technological, temporal, or geographical basis) that normally exists between
the ﬁrm and counterpart at early stages of interaction is likely to be
diminished as both parties gradually get to know and trust each other and
invest in the development of the business relationship.
Ford (1980) and Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) propose two models
for the relationship development process, according to which business
relationships go through a series of stages: the ‘‘pre-relationship,’’ ‘‘early,’’
‘‘development,’’ ‘‘long-term,’’ and ‘‘ﬁnal’’ stages in the former model;
and the ‘‘awareness,’’ ‘‘exploration,’’ ‘‘expansion,’’ ‘‘commitment,’’ and
‘‘dissolution’’ stages in the latter model. These relationship development
models make an implicit use of the ‘‘marriage’’ metaphor, thus presuming
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that business relationships necessarily develop toward an ideal state – ‘‘the
successful marriage’’ – characterized by a high degree of cooperation (and
a low degree of conﬂict) between parties. Wilkinson and Young’s (1994)
empirical research on more than 600 business relationships offer strong
evidences that relationship development does not follow such ideal path –
from ‘‘poor,’’ highly competitive business relationships to ‘‘good,’’ totally
cooperative ones – as suggested in the above-mentioned ‘‘life cycle’’ models
of relationship development. Business relationships may fail to develop and
are eventually terminated, owing to persistent ‘‘barriers to interaction,’’ for
instance arising from economic, political, social, or cultural features of the
countries in which ﬁrms operate or deriving from mismatches between
parties (in terms of size, organizational culture, objectives, decisions, or
actions) or conﬂicting expectations and behaviors of individuals and groups
involved in business relationships (Cunningham, 1982). These barriers, in
general transitory, can be removed (e.g., through deepening interpersonal
contacts) but always at a cost. Biong, Wathne, and Parvatiyar (1997) offer
two other reasons that can account for relationship dissolution: lack of
relational orientation and mutual commitment by (or changed requirements
of ) one or both of parties involved; and a nonpositive relationship value
(i.e., relationship sacriﬁces more than offset, or simply equate beneﬁts), for
one if not both of parties. On the termination of business relationships, and
its determinants and consequences, see Alajoutsijarvi, Moller, and Tahtinen
(2000), Giller and Matear (2001), Gronhaug, Henjesand, & Koveland
(1999), Halinen and Tahtinen (2002), Tahtinen and Halinen (2002),
Tahtinen and Havila (2004), Tahtinen and Vaaland (2006), Tuusjarvi and
Blois (2004), Vaaland (2004), and Vaaland, Haugland, and Purchase (2004).
The development of business relationships in the business world is,
therefore, best described, not by resorting to the marriage metaphor, but
instead by deploying a ‘‘dancing’’ analogy whereby leading of and following
by parties is presumed (Wilkinson & Young, 1994).
4.2. Substance of Business Relationships
Each and every business relationship comprises multiple short-term
‘‘interaction episodes’’ (e.g., face-to-face meetings, negotiations via tele-
phone or email, deliveries, and payments) in which some content is
exchanged between buyer and seller (Hakansson, 1982a). Interaction
episodes are difﬁcult to delimit in time for each episode’s beginning
and end cannot be unambiguously identiﬁed even by cooperating ﬁrms
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(Ford & Hakansson, 2006a). Business relationships allow goods and/or
services to be traded for money but also entail mutual exchange of
knowledge and social values (i.e., trust and commitment) between parties.
Axelrod (1984) advances two necessary conditions for the development
and sustainment of business relationships: ﬁrst, a (largely perceived) history
of rewarding and trustworthy cooperation in the past; and second, a large
‘‘shadow of the future’’ (i.e., existence of mutual and converging
expectations concerning valuable cooperation in the future). This is not to
say that overall structure of business networks (i.e., connected business
relationships) do not affect relationship nature (and development) (Ford,
Hakansson, & Johanson, 1986).
The ‘‘substance’’ of business relationships includes a set of several
characteristics: some that are readily perceptible at ﬁrst glance, while others
can only be discovered after in-depth look (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995).
Perceptible, so-called ‘‘structural’’ characteristics – namely ‘‘informality,’’
‘‘continuity,’’ ‘‘symmetry,’’ and ‘‘complexity’’ – give business relationships
a sense of stability. Yet when looked at more carefully, business relation-
ships turn out to be quite dynamic. The ‘‘process’’ features of business
relationships are ‘‘adaptations,’’ ‘‘coopetition,’’ ‘‘social interaction,’’ and
‘‘routinization.’’ Business relationships are stable but not completely static
phenomena (Easton, 1992).
4.2.1. Structural Features
4.2.1.1. Informality. Like other forms of cooperation, interﬁrm coopera-
tion does not require formal agreements between parties, with a large
shadow of the future (for both ﬁrms) being sufﬁcient. Business relationships
are not in general governed by legal contracts, relying instead on implicit
self-enforcement mechanisms – such as trust, commitment, and mutuality
(Hakansson & Johanson, 1988) – or at the very least, exhibiting a low degree
of formalization. As Macneil (1978) warns, formal contracts are unlikely to
be effective in coping with the conﬂicts and uncertainties necessarily arising
between both parties over time. The informality commonly present in
business relationships in fact contributes to the continuity of those vertical
cooperative linkages.
4.2.1.2. Continuity. Business relationships are long-lasting phenomena of
the business, often developed and maintained over more than 10 years
(Johanson & Hallen, 1989), and built on intricate patterns of interpersonal
contacts and social liaisons permeating several functions and hierarchical
levels in both parties involved (Cunningham & Turnbull, 1982).
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4.2.1.3. Symmetry. Business relationships are (more or less) symmetrical in
terms of both parties’ initiative and interest to develop and sustain that
interﬁrm cooperation. Despite the symmetry of initiatives and interests,
business relationships are often asymmetrical with respect to power and
dependence issues. One knows that dependence is inversely associated with
possession of power (Emerson, 1962), for the greater the power that the ﬁrm
has in the business network, the less the ﬁrm is likely to depend on others
with which maintains business relationships. ‘‘The dependencies may be
mutual, but are not necessarily so; in general, it may be assumed that they
are more or less asymmetrical in the sense that one party is more dependent
on the relationship than the other’’ (Johanson & Mattsson, 1987, p. 39).
Inasmuch as some ﬁrms are more ‘‘powerful’’ than others (e.g., owing to
possession of valuable resources and competences or holding a dominant
network position), asymmetries characterize business relationships – for
instance, explaining why relationship beneﬁts are unevenly distributed
between cooperative parties. Yet business relationships can never be
unilaterally dominated by one of parties, no matter how great that party’s
power is and no matter how great control or inﬂuence that party exerts over
the other (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995).
4.2.1.4. Complexity. The complex nature of business relationships derives
from the number of individuals and groups involved in contact patterns
between ﬁrms (and the diverse and potentially conﬂicting roles, statuses,
expectations, interests, intents, perceptions, and interpretations of those
individuals and groups), and most importantly, from the different functions
that business relationships can perform for both parties involved (e.g., to
access and exploration external resources and competences).
4.2.2. Process Features
4.2.2.1. Adaptations. Adaptations are relationship-speciﬁc investments
made by two cooperative parties over time in order to achieve ﬁt to one
another (Brennan & Canning, 2002; Brennan & Turnbull, 1998, 1999). Firms
adjust products, production processes, scheduling routines, administrative
procedures, and payment systems toward one another, strengthening
interdependence and generating mutual trust and commitment, thus
permitting easier resolution of potential conﬂicts arising within business
relationships. Given the extent of adaptations effected, the ﬁrm becomes
increasingly ‘‘particularized’’ to counterpart and vice versa – so-called
‘‘particularity’’ feature of interaction (Ford et al., 1986).
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Many adaptations are effected in an unplanned way, being largely
invisible to (and, as a result, seldom monitored by) ﬁrms’ top management.
Adaptations are usually known only by personnel directly involved in the
management of business relationships, namely of marketing and purchasing
departments. Adaptations emerge ad hoc so that ﬁrms may cope with issues
arising as business relationships develop over time; notwithstanding,
adaptations can be subject to ex post formalization if contractually agreed
by parties (Ford, 1980). Although mutual adaptations are the rule in
business relationships, adaptations can be on occasion unilateral (e.g., the
ﬁrm is forced to acquire a new supply IT platform in response to the
pressure of a powerful supplier). While one is prone to claim that unilateral
adaptations by each of parties often precede mutual adaptations, Hallen,
Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed (1991, p. 34) alert to the difﬁculty of clearly
identifying that each of these two kinds of adaptations is not without
reason: ‘‘Partly the adaptations are made unilaterally as a consequence of
imbalance in the interﬁrm power relation, and partly the adaptations are
reciprocal demonstrations of commitment and trust in the relationship.’’
One needs to note that adaptations are necessarily interrelated to some
extent since business relationships compete for the limited resources of both
parties. For instance, adaptation in one business relationship may imply
‘‘maladaptation’’ in another, connected business relationship (Ritter, 1999).
For the often substantial amounts of money and time devoted by parties to
a speciﬁc business relationship are unlikely to be transferred to other
relationships – that is, have low or zero value in alternative uses, that is,
sunk costs – and are therefore likely to involve considerable opportunity
costs for ﬁrms.
4.2.2.2. Coopetition. Inasmuch as ﬁrms have common and conﬂicting
interests, coopetition thrives within business relationships (Bengtsson &
Kock, 2000; Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996). Richardson (1972, p. 895) is
probably the ﬁrst to stress that competition and cooperation coexist within
business relationships. ‘‘I have sought to stress the co-operative element
in business relations but by no means take the view that where there is
co-operation, competition is no more.’’
Easton and Araujo (1992) attempt to describe the different degrees to
which diametrically different ‘‘logics’’ of interaction (namely cooperation
and competition) can be found simultaneously in the ‘‘atmosphere’’ of
business relationships, by hypothesizing ﬁve stages of a ‘‘corelation’’
dimension: ‘‘conﬂict’’ (i.e., both parties merely seek to destroy one another),
‘‘competition’’ (i.e., each party only aspires to remain ahead of the other,
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taken as a rival), ‘‘coexistence’’ (i.e., parties are unaware of each other’s
existence or if aware, choose not to compete), ‘‘cooperation’’ (i.e., both
parties collaborate in order to attain common or compatible goals), and
‘‘collusion’’ (i.e., parties agree to cooperate with the purpose of damaging
others’ welfare, e.g., of customers or common competitors). These ﬁve
stages give support to the heterogeneity of business relationships – that
exhibit cooperation, but also feature coexistence, conﬂict, or even collusion
to diverse extents.
4.2.2.3. Social Interaction. Business relationships entail prominently
extensive social contacts between individuals and groups of both parties.
Hakansson and Snehota (1995, p. 10) stress eloquently the social nature
of business relationships: ‘‘Machine-like relationships do not exist.’’
Through individual and groups bonds, ‘‘(y) information is exchanged,
adaptations are agreed, negotiations are performed, [and] crises are
overcome (y)’’ (Turnbull et al., 1996, p. 57). Interpersonal bonds that
ﬁrms’ members establish, develop, and sustain over time make business
relationships capable of withstanding disruptive forces (e.g., a short
episode of opportunistic behavior by a counterpart) (Easton & Araujo,
1986; Wilson & Mummaleneni, 1986). In Hirschman’s (1970) terminology,
one may say that parties usually prefer ‘‘voice’’ to ‘‘exit’’ – the former option
being a better conﬂict-resolution mechanism than the latter, which is
neither easy nor costless. Business relationships display mutual orientation
inasmuch as both parties have mutual knowledge of, and respect for
each others’ strategies, interests, ambitions, and the like and are willing
to refrain in part self-interest (and fall short of attaining own goals) in order
to pursue common or compatible objectives (Ford et al., 1986). Mutuality or
‘‘jointness’’ helps to counterbalance the conﬂict of interests inevitably
arising between parties (Ford & Hakansson, 2006a).
Multiplex interpersonal contacts between ﬁrms over time are responsible
for developing the atmosphere of business relationships, an atmosphere
framing all interﬁrm interactions. ‘‘This atmosphere can be described in
terms of the power-dependence relationship which exists between the
companies, the state of conﬂict or cooperation and overall closeness
or distance of the relationship as well as by the companies’ mutual
expectations’’ (Hakansson, 1982a, p. 21). The development of business
relationships is strongly dependent on the respective atmosphere, that is to
say, the intensity and width of parties’ interpersonal contacts.
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4.2.2.4. Routinization. The routinization of interaction episodes over
time leads to the development of expectations about the roles that each
party expects the other to perform – a long-term process known as
‘‘institutionalization’’ (Ford et al., 1986). Rights and duties of both parties
become informally institutionalized (i.e., self-policing and self-enforcing),
somewhat materialized in norms of proper conduct. Institutionalization,
however, is not without problems. On occasion routine patterns of
operation give the wrong impression that parties are less committed to
each other, as each evolving needs and requirements are not being
continually attended to (Ford, 1980). In these cases, mutual commitment
(despite being eventually at a maximum) is perceived by both parties to
be minimal – with potential effects on each party’s future behavior and
consequently input into the business relationship.
4.3. Role of Business Relationships
One is likely to ﬁnd at the root of business relationships a ‘‘what can
you do for me? what can I do for you?’’ kind of reasoning (Ford et al.,
1986). By means of a business relationship, both parties are able to
obtain ‘‘something’’ that would or could not obtain alone or at a reasonable
cost or timely, and that is to some extent worthwhile – something that
resembles Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) ‘‘team effects.’’ But what
propels the ﬁrm and the counterpart into a business relationship? Or, as
Ford et al. (1998) put it, what can parties offer to as well as demand from
each other?
The role of business relationships is strongly dependent on relationship
nature (Blankenburg-Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 1999; Naude & Buttle,
2000; Walter & Ritter, 2003). That is, only ‘‘substantial’’ business
relationships (entailing high degrees of mutual trust, commitment, adapta-
tions, and interdependence) are likely to generate more positive than
negative outcomes for the ﬁrm. This is not to say that the role of a business
relationship has no effect on its nature (see, e.g., Ulaga & Eggert, 2006;
Walter, Muller, Helfert, & Ritter, 2003; Walter, Ritter, & Gemunden, 2001).
One expects that a mutually rewarding business relationship is continually
nurtured and sustained by both parties, that is, relationship nature is
contingent on relationship role. The nature and role of business relation-
ships change over time owing to: ﬁrst, ﬁrm’s internal change or of
counterpart; second, shared initiative of parties; or ﬁnally, change taking
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place elsewhere, for instance, in supplier’s suppliers or within indirectly
connected business relationships (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995).
Business relationships are established, developed, and maintained largely
owing to rewarding ‘‘functions’’ that perform presently (or are likely to
perform in the future) and the positive outcomes (i.e., ‘‘beneﬁts’’) that are
appropriated by both parties. Nevertheless, relationship ‘‘dysfunctions’’ or
‘‘nonfunctions’’ are often performed and thus some negative outcomes
(i.e., ‘‘sacriﬁces’’) invariably ensue to both parties.
4.3.1. Relationship Functions, Dysfunctions, Beneﬁts, and Sacriﬁces
A certain business relationship can perform, at a given point in time, more
than one function for the ﬁrm. That same business relationship is likely to
perform different functions over time and similar relationship functions can
be performed in different business relationships of the ﬁrm. Relationship
functions can be of two types: ‘‘primary’’ or ‘‘secondary.’’ Primary functions
bring about relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces that are immediately
obtained by the ﬁrm and/or ensue independently of connected business
relationships or counterparts; secondary functions, on the other hand,
generate relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces only in the future and/or
depending on connected business relationships or counterparts, respectively
(Hakansson & Johanson, 1993a). Secondary relationship functions can be as
important to the ﬁrm as primary ones (Anderson, Hakansson, & Johanson,
1994). This argument is corroborated by Hakansson and Snehota (1995)
who claim that business relationships accomplish functions not only for
each and both of the parties involved, but also for other ﬁrms directly and
indirectly connected to the former.
Relationship dysfunctions pertain to the fact that the business relation-
ship does not perform (some or all) functions expected or desired by the ﬁrm
and/or precludes the performance of expected or desired functions in other,
connected business relationships.
Relationship beneﬁts include all the positive outcomes accruing to the
ﬁrm from the performance of any of relationship functions (Anderson et al.,
1994). Relationship sacriﬁces encompass both the costs incurred by the
ﬁrm and the deleterious outcomes that necessarily result from being
involved in business relationships. Relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces are
not unconnected: beneﬁts are not obtained automatically, easily or for free,
being partly dependent on sacriﬁces (Gadde & Snehota, 2000). Relationship
outcomes, namely beneﬁts and sacriﬁces, can neither be totally predicted
ex ante nor fully quantiﬁed ex post by the ﬁrm. ‘‘Some [relationship]
consequences are quite easy to exposure, measure and quantify; others are
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less obvious, more indirect and more difﬁcult to measure, but no less
important’’ (Gadde & Snehota, 2000, p. 307). Diverse beneﬁts and
sacriﬁces are typically expected in different business relationships (Wiley,
Wilkinson, & Young, 2006). The division of beneﬁts and sacriﬁces between
parties is not necessarily equitable, depending, for instance, on what is
contractually agreed by or the relative power of the parties involved.
Relationship beneﬁts are usually weighted against the sacriﬁces (mostly
costs) needed to attain the former (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). The ﬁrm is
able to appropriate ‘‘relationship value’’ whenever relationship beneﬁts
exceed sacriﬁces (Anderson, 1995; Blois, 2004, 1999, 2003; Wilson &
Jantrania, 1994). Relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces can also be compared
to the ‘‘comparison level’’ (CL) and/or to the ‘‘comparison level for
alternatives’’ (CLalt), that is, expected relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces
(by taking into account the ﬁrm’s experience with similar business
relationships in the past) and beneﬁts and sacriﬁces potentially available
in next-best substitute business relationships, respectively, (Anderson et al.,
1994); and beneﬁts and sacriﬁces potentially obtainable in alternative
governance structures such as hierarchies and markets, that is, if the ﬁrm
decides to vertically integrate, or instead engage in arm’s-length relations
with counterparts, respectively (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). See Sousa and Castro
(this volume) on a sixfold list of relationship functions and dysfunctions,
and related beneﬁts and sacriﬁces.
4.4. The Network View of the Business World
4.4.1. Generalized Connectedness
One of the basic claims of MAN theory is that B2B markets are not
completely atomistic and faceless, for ﬁrms do establish, develop, and
maintain business relationships with one another. MAN theorists argue thus
for both the interrelatedness or embeddedness of ﬁrms and the ‘‘generalized
connectedness’’ of business relationships (Blankenburg-Holm & Johanson,
1992; Ritter, 2000).
The ﬁrm’s survival and growth is inﬂuenced by and inﬂuences to a large
degree the survival and growth of counterparts – so-called ‘‘coevolution’’
feature of business networks (Ford et al., 1998). Relationship connectedness
implies that what happens within each business relationship affects and is
affected by what happens within other business relationships with which
the former is (directly or indirectly, positively or negatively) connected to.
Business relationships can be indirectly connected (e.g., when two business
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relationships’ connection is mediated by a third business relationship) or
positively or negatively connected (e.g., when interaction in one business
relationship is dependent upon the existence or absence of interaction in
other business relationships).
4.4.2. Networks’ Structure and Development
Owing to the notorious connectedness of business relationships, B2B
markets are frequently referred to as ‘‘industrial systems’’ or ‘‘industrial
networks,’’ thus depicted as intricate networks composed essentially of a
myriad of ‘‘actor bonds,’’ ‘‘resource ties,’’ and ‘‘activity links’’ – the three
‘‘substance layers’’ of business relationships postulated in the ARA Model
(Hakansson & Johanson, 1992). The ARA model draws upon Cyert and
March’s (1963) behavioral theory (e.g., assuming the bounded rationality of
actors) while retaining strong Penrose (1959) and Richardson (1972) ﬂavors
on corporate resources and activities, respectively. In ARA’s model main
assumptions are (Hakansson, 1989, 1987) as follows: actors (namely, ﬁrms
as a whole or individuals, groups, and departments within ﬁrms or even
groups of ﬁrms) perform activities via deployment of directly and/or
indirectly controlled resources (i.e., resources owned by the actor and/or
resources accessed and explored via business relationships with other actors,
respectively); all three substance layers of business relationships are
interrelated, for instance, by strengthening actor bonds one obtains
both stronger activity links and resource ties, or vice versa; and ﬁrms
are ‘‘collective, purposeful actors,’’ ‘‘resource collections,’’ and ‘‘activity
structures’’ deeply embedded in networks, which are in turn ‘‘webs of
actors,’’ ‘‘resource constellations,’’ and ‘‘activity chains.’’
Business networks are likely to display four prominent features
(Hakansson & Johanson, 1988, 1993b): ﬁrst, business networks are not
designed by a single ﬁrm and imposed on others, being instead formed and
modiﬁed through multiplex interaction among ﬁrms; second, business
networks are opaque for ﬁrms have unclear (and not necessarily similar)
views of own and of others’ actor bonds, resource ties, and activity links,
that is to say, of the network’s overall structure; third, business networks do
not have a center, for instance, a ﬁrm serving as a network captain or hub;
and fourth, business networks do not have clearly deﬁned boundaries
(for network boundaries are arbitrary, e.g., drawn in accord to focal actor,
technology, country, or product type) – in fact, business networks are
unbounded as can extend without limits given the connectedness of business
relationships.
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Business networks are elaborate structures wherein stability coexists
with change. Within business networks, patterns of ‘‘structuring’’
and ‘‘hierarchization’’ (i.e., stability) are counterbalanced by waves of
‘‘heterogenizing’’ and ‘‘externalization’’ (i.e., change). Hakansson (1992)
describes these network processes as follows: structuring as the improved
use of known resource dimensions; heterogenizing as the exploration of
new resource dimensions or use of known dimensions in novel ways;
hierarchization as the increase in control over resources; and externalization
(or ‘‘extrication’’) as the decrease in resources’ control.
Stability in business networks results from the institutionalization taking
place within business relationships through which reciprocal norms of
conduct are agreed by parties (review Section 4.2.2.4). Stability – sometimes
even inertia – is also a consequence of the (usually high) costs of change
faced by ﬁrms within business relationships (e.g., switching costs involved in
the termination of the ﬁrm’s business relationship with supplier A and
the initiation of a new business relationship with supplier B). ‘‘Because
[business] relationships are substantial, they are not easy to change quickly
and changes are likely to incur signiﬁcant costs, both in disruption and in
developing new relationships. This tends to make business markets rather
stable.’’ (Ford et al., 1998, p. 43, emphasis in original). Facilitating or
blocking a network change is always costly and typically requires the
mobilization of other ﬁrms and of corporate resources (Lundgren, 1992).
Unless mobilizes other ﬁrms and resources (through business relationships),
the ﬁrm will face enormous costs of change and inertia is bound to prevail –
the ‘‘heaviness’’ of the network (Hakansson & Ford, 2002).
The stability of networks, however, is only apparent insofar as
incessant change takes place both within ﬁrms and business relationships.
Stability is a prerequisite to change – stability (e.g., in actor bonds) reduces
the uncertainties of ﬁrms, thereby increasing corporate propensity to
participate actively in the production and promotion of change (Lundgren,
1992). Change, in turn, is vital for stability. For instance, a change in certain
activity links at a given point in time can be crucial for the stability of some
actor bonds in the future.
Network change is usually incremental and strongly related to the
past, that is, path-dependent (Araujo & Harrison, 2002; Hakansson &
Waluszewski, 2002), though on occasion can be of a disruptive or
revolutionary kind. Connectedness of business relationships implies that
any change – occurring at ﬁrm or relationship levels – is propagated in
a nondeterministic chain effect throughout the business network (Hertz,
1998). Propagation of network change does not ensue in a preordered way
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(e.g., as determined by a powerful ﬁrm) or can be absorbed or reﬂected
instead of being transmitted to others. For Easton and Lundgren (1992),
ﬁrms are both sources and recipients of network change and business
networks are sets of ‘‘nodes’’ through which change ﬂows somehow
(is reﬂected, adapted to, absorbed, transmitted, or transformed). One can
thus identify ﬁve alternative propagation modes for network change:
‘‘reﬂection’’ (i.e., change initiated by the ﬁrm is nulliﬁed or reﬂected by
counterparts), ‘‘adaptation’’ (i.e., change remains only within a certain
dyad, thus does not affect other ﬁrms or business relationships, being
modiﬁed through bilateral negotiations), ‘‘absorption’’ (i.e., the ﬁrm
‘‘incorporates’’ the change only within boundaries, not transmitting it to
others), ‘‘transmission’’ (i.e., the ﬁrm transmits the received change with
minimal or no modiﬁcations to the rest of the network), and ‘‘transmuta-
tion’’ (i.e., the ﬁrm ‘‘transforms’’ the change and then propagates it to other
ﬁrms). The ﬁrm’s behavior toward a certain network change (e.g., reﬂecting
or absorbing it) differs according to the degree to which the change relates
to ﬁrm’s interests and ambitions and the atmosphere of the business
relationship that the ﬁrm has with the initiator of that change. Business
networks are composed of different types of nodes, therefore reﬂecting,
adapting to, absorbing, transmitting, and transforming network change.
The existence of only one type of nodes (e.g., reﬂecting or transforming
ones) would make business networks either totally unchangeable or very
unstable. Business networks are neither ﬁxed nor chaotic structures
(Wilkinson & Young, 2002).
4.4.3. Managing in Business Networks
Business networks are coproduced, self-organizing, and adaptive systems
wherein cooperation predominates despite corporate power being unevenly
distributed among ﬁrms (Wilkinson & Young, 2002). Business networks
are characterized by the prevalence of ‘‘political’’ processes by which ﬁrms
strive with one another and seek support for own interests and objectives.
All ﬁrms have limited control over counterparts and consequently no single
ﬁrm controls unilaterally the business network – despite multiple attempts
of each of ﬁrms in order to increase control over the business network.
Business networks thus feature a ﬁerce struggle for network control, a
struggle that takes place not only between ﬁrms but also within ﬁrms – for
multiple actors exist at different organizational levels. ‘‘Network control is
reached through control over resources and/or activities. Increased control
over resources is a matter of increasing the control of resources directly,
of increasing the indirect control over other resources via relationships, and
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of reducing indirect control [of resources] by other actors through
relationships, that is increasing autonomy. Control of activities is a matter
of control over resources and [possession of] knowledge’’ (Hakansson &
Johanson, 1992, p. 29). An increase in the ﬁrm’s network control is in
general achieved at the expense of other ﬁrms’ network control but that
needs not be always the case. Indeed ‘‘(y) the increased control of one actor
may (y) lead to an increased control of some other actors in the network’’
(Hakansson & Johanson, 1992, p. 30). One should not confuse the
‘‘lobbying’’ actions of ﬁrms (to increase network power) with the inﬂuence
of political entities on the establishment, development, and sustainment
of business relationships and networks (see, e.g., Hadjikhani, 2000;
Hadjikhani & Hakansson, 1996; Hadjikhani & Sharma, 1999; Welch &
Wilkinson, 2004 on the latter).
The evolution of business networks is continually shaped by a collective
networking process beyond any ﬁrm’s power or intents. Business networks
evolve as multiple interﬁrm interactions take place over time. Network
(macro) order is determined by innumerable dyadic (micro) interactions
(Wilkinson & Young, 2002). No ﬁrm or coalition of ﬁrms can alone
inﬂuence that undirected process of network evolution to own advantage.
‘‘No-one manages the network, but many have to try to manage in it’’ (Ford
et al., 1998, p. 270, emphasis in original). Each ﬁrm is but one of many
actors having partial inﬂuence on both the structure and functioning of
business networks. Total control over a business network would render
it a extremely large hierarchy (i.e., a ﬁrm), probably inﬂexible and less
responsive to change initiated elsewhere (Hakansson & Ford, 2002).
Operating in business networks (i.e., networking) is not a straightforward
task for ﬁrms, as entails ‘‘(y) initiating and responding, acting and
reacting, leading and following, inﬂuencing and being inﬂuenced, planning
and (y) improvising, forcing and adapting’’ (Ritter et al., 2004, p. 178).
Networking requires simultaneously the combination of cooperation and
conﬂict and the pursuit of self and mutual interests. As Ford et al. (1998,
p. 1, emphasis in original) say, networking is about ‘‘(y) working with other
companies, but it also involves working against them, through them and
often in spite of them.’’ For Hakansson and Ford (2002), networking
pertains to coping with three paradoxes intrinsic to the structure of business
networks, namely: exploring multiple opportunities while avoiding or
minimizing unavoidable threats, inﬂuencing and being inﬂuenced by
counterparts, and increasing and losing control over the business network.
Ford, Gadde, Hakansson, and Snehota (2002) elaborate on these three
networking tasks, contending that the ﬁrm needs to confront or conform to
Markets-as-Networks Theory: A Review 433
the prevailing status quo in the network; consolidate existing or create new
network positions; and coerce or concede to counterparts’ goals and intents,
respectively.
4.4.4. The Embedded Firm’s Context and Boundaries
Empirical studies of MAN theorists demonstrate that the ﬁrm is not an
isolated and totally independent entity operating in atomistic and faceless
markets, by exchanging with counterparts only at arm’s-length distance.
The ‘‘real’’ ﬁrm is semi-autonomous, being deeply embedded in a variegated
texture of interdependences, mostly of an economic, social, and technical
kind. The ﬁrm itself, as some MAN theorists recognize (e.g., Ritter et al.,
2004), is but a network of internal relationships (across diverse hierarchical
levels, departments, or functions) somewhat purposefully designed to bring
about goods or services (Krackhart & Hanson, 1993).
The ﬁrm is endowed with only limited resources and competences, thus
being in need of external (often complementary) resources and competences
for survival and growth. Corporate heterogeneity is both result of and cause
for ﬁrms’ embeddedness (Dubois & Torvatn, 2002; Hakansson & Snehota,
1989). Whereas some resources and competences are internally developed
by the ﬁrm, other resources and competences are acquired or accessed and
explored through cooperation. The resource and competence base of the
ﬁrm can be enlarged (or reduced) via purely transactional relations
and business relationships with counterparts, respectively. As Ford et al.
(1986) note, the ﬁrm is not a unilateral ‘‘decision-maker’’ and ‘‘resource
controller.’’ Instead of being a mere ‘‘production function,’’ the ﬁrm is
effectively an ‘‘interaction-oriented’’ unit (Hakansson & Snehota, 1989).
The ﬁrm does not operate only in a fully hostile and uncontrollable
environment somewhere ‘‘out there’’ and comprising a large number of
forces (e.g., of political, economical, technological, and social kinds) that
exert a strong inﬂuence on corporate survival and growth. Besides this
broad and faceless environment (that lasts independently of the ﬁrm), one
needs to acknowledge the existence of a ‘‘context’’ (Hakansson & Snehota,
1989) – or ‘‘an interacted environment,’’ as some MAN theorists call it
(Ford et al., 1986). The ﬁrm is surrounded by a context, that is to say,
a ﬁnite set of distinct yet clearly identiﬁable counterparts with which
establishes, develops, maintains, and terminates diverse linkages over time –
suppliers, customers, suppliers’ suppliers, customers’ customers, competi-
tors, and so forth. Each context is unique, being co-created and shaped to
some extent by the ﬁrm and each and every of counterparts – two ﬁrms’
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contexts, however, can be partly overlapped (for instance, supplier A and
customer B are both a part of the contexts of the ﬁrm and of counterpart C).
Corporate boundaries – in particular vertical boundaries, separating the
ﬁrm upward from suppliers and downward from customers – are usually
drawn by the hierarchical control of resources and competences. Ownership
deﬁned by property rights unambiguously delimitates vertical corporate
boundaries (Hart & Moore, 1990). A clear-cut dividing line thus separates
the ﬁrm from whatever surrounds it (for the most part, an environment).
The ﬁrm-environment dividing line is one of ‘‘cooperation-competition’’:
cooperation only taking place within the ﬁrm, and competition only
occurring outside it. Two reasons allow one to call into question the realism
of such atomistic view: though cooperative efforts abound within the ﬁrm,
intraﬁrm political struggles are also frequently witnessed (e.g., Mintzberg,
1985; Pettigrew, 1973), and cooperation necessarily thrives outside the ﬁrm
(for instance, in the multiple business relationships that the ﬁrm and
competitors develop and maintain with common suppliers and customers).
The ﬁrm is not a completely autonomous and clearly bounded entity
surrounded by a wider environment over which has in general no inﬂuence.
On the contrary, the ﬁrm is a networked entity without rigid vertical
boundaries for is ‘‘constituted’’ to a large degree by the resources and
competences owned by all the counterparts existing in context (Hakansson
& Snehota, 1995). Corporate vertical boundaries are not ﬁxed once and
for all, being instead blurred (owing to the great importance of external
resources and competences) and changeable (for those boundaries are
continually shaped via the ﬁrm’s interaction with counterparts).
Some MAN theorists go even further by claiming that the ﬁrm is
‘‘boundaryless’’ (e.g., Hakansson & Snehota, 1989). Resources and
competences, both internal and external, are critical to the ﬁrm’s survival
and growth. The borderline between internal and external resources and
competences is increasingly fuzzy given the amount and extent of prevailing
ﬁrms’ interdependences. Internally owned resources and competences are in
part out of the ﬁrm’s control, while external resources and competences
(accessed and explored through business relationships) are partly subject to
the ﬁrm’s control.
The ﬁrm holds a particular position in the network (e.g., central or
peripheral) – though often is said to occupy several network positions
according to diverse vantage points adopted, for instance, by an outside
observer or network actor. Network positions result from lengthy, costly,
cumulative, and interdependent investment processes (Mattsson, 1989) and
are interrelated to diverse extents – not only a change in a ﬁrm’s network
Markets-as-Networks Theory: A Review 435
position is likely to have repercussions on the network positions of
counterparts but also the ﬁrm’s network positions (past and current) restrict
as well as offer possibilities for developing network positions and new
business relationships in the future. A network position is deﬁned by the
several business relationships maintained (and the nature of these relation-
ships and the network position of counterparts), setting limits on the ﬁrm’s
behavior and enforcing rights and obligations in the network both at present
and in the future (Henders, 1992) and providing the ﬁrm with a peculiar
‘‘network identity’’ and ‘‘network theory’’ as well as narrowing ‘‘network
pictures’’ within or beyond the ﬁrm’s ‘‘network horizon.’’
The ﬁrm has an identity of its own in the business network in which it is
embedded. Network identity is developed through interaction with counter-
parts and ‘‘(y) refers to the views – both inside and outside the ﬁrm – about
the ﬁrm’s role and position in relation to other ﬁrms in the industrial
network’’ (Hakansson & Johanson, 1988, p. 373). Alternatively, Anderson
et al. (1994) take network identity as the perceived attractiveness
(or ‘‘repulsiveness’’) of the ﬁrm as a business partner, that perception being
of the ﬁrm itself and of other ﬁrms (i.e., actual and potential counterparts).
The ﬁrm’s network theory draws to a large extent upon information
channeled through business relationships and comprises corporate percep-
tions, expectations, and intentions regarding existing and potential business
relationships (Mattsson & Johanson, 1992). Network theory can be used to
inﬂuence the network theories of counterparts (e.g., by changing counter-
parts’ perceptions about whether, and to what extent certain business
relationships are complementary or rival), or to create a new or redeﬁne the
prevailing dominant network theory (shared to some degree by all ﬁrms in a
business network). Network theory inﬂuences to some extent the ﬁrm’s and
counterparts’ decisions and actions in business networks.
The ﬁrm has but a limited knowledge of the surrounding business
network in which it is deeply embedded. This limited knowledge is
accounted for by the network positions and consequent network horizon
of the ﬁrm, both of which are likely to change over time. Moller and Halinen
(1999, p. 417) emphasize that knowledge generation about business
networks is problematic for the ﬁrm, while claiming that in-depth
knowledge can only be generated by taking part of the business network,
that is, by having business relationships with (knowledgeable) counterparts.
Nevertheless, the ﬁrm is able to ‘‘make sense of’’ the business network via
network pictures subjectively devised by managers (Ford & Redwood,
2005). Network pictures are usually pictorial (more or less ‘‘realistic’’)
representations of the ﬁrm’s immediate context and of what is beyond the
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ﬁrm’s network horizon (i.e., the ‘‘visible’’ or ‘‘known’’ part of the overall
network) and constitute an important input in the decision making
underlying the ﬁrm’s networking processes (Henneberg, Mouzas, & Naude,
2006). Richer network pictures are necessarily narrow, addressing the ﬁrm’s
network horizon and context in detail. Multiple network pictures can be
found within the ﬁrm, whereas overlaps between the network pictures of
multiple ﬁrms are also common.
Network horizon pertains to ‘‘(y) the part of the network that a ﬁrm is
aware of and thereby can take into account’’ (Holmen & Pedersen, 2003,
p. 409). The ﬁrm is necessarily myopic and thus its network horizon is more
or less narrow. The ﬁrm’s network horizon is capable of being extended or
diminished, with the increase or decrease in the ﬁrm’s experience in the
business network (e.g., by reinforcing existing or developing new actor
bonds, resource ties, and activity links). Although the network horizon is
often mingled with that of network context – for instance, ‘‘[t]he part of
the network within the horizon that the actor considers relevant is the
actor’s network context (y)’’ (Anderson et al., 1994, p. 4) – one can argue
that network context can include several counterparts of which the ﬁrm is
unaware of but which affect it in some way. That is, the ﬁrm’s context is far
more comprehensive than its network horizon (i.e., the counterparts and
business relationships that the ﬁrm knows about or merely acknowledges).
In order to operate effectively in its network context, the ﬁrm makes
use of ‘‘indirect’’ or ‘‘relational’’ or ‘‘network competences’’ (Ritter &
Gemunden, 2003b). These competences are found within all ﬁrms to a
greater or lesser degree, and can be divided into ‘‘relationship-speciﬁc’’ (i.e.,
dyadic) and ‘‘cross-relational’’ (i.e., ‘‘portfolio’’ and ‘‘net’’) competences
(Ritter, 1999). That is to say, network competences are deployed at different
levels, enabling the ﬁrm to manage: each of business relationships in
isolation (and their constitutive interaction episodes), and the portfolio or
net of business relationships (i.e., only the ﬁrm’s business relationships that
are similar, typically supplier and customer relationship portfolios, or all
of the business relationships in which the ﬁrm is directly involved in,
respectively) (Ritter & Gemunden, 2003a).
Moller and Halinen (1999) argue for the existence of four types of
network competences: ‘‘relationship management competences’’ to estab-
lish, develop, maintain, and terminate each of the ﬁrm’s business relation-
ships, thus helping to build, protect, or alter positions in the network;
‘‘portfolio management competences’’ to manage (suboptimally) supplier
and customer portfolios of the ﬁrm; ‘‘net management competences’’ in
order to mobilize counterparts (e.g., to promote a desired network change);
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and ‘‘network visioning competences’’ that permit the ﬁrm to develop valid
knowledge of the business network’s composition and evolution (i.e., by
constructing and revising network pictures), hence possibly extending the
ﬁrm’s network horizon and contributing to the continuous upgrading of
the ﬁrm’s network theory and the reinforcement (or change) of its network
identity.
Network competences, like any other competences of the ﬁrm, erode over
time. So, network competences need to be nurtured by the ﬁrm, for instance,
through investments on internal resources speciﬁcally devoted to the
management of business relationships (e.g., up-to-date IT, highly qualiﬁed
marketing personnel), or continuous efforts in the open-mindedness of
organizational culture (e.g., promoting empowerment and informality in
work liaisons) (Ritter, 1999).
4.4.5. Strategizing in Business Networks
Mainstream theories of strategic management – for example, the ‘‘resource-
based view of the ﬁrm’’ (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) or the ‘‘industry
and competitive analysis’’ (Porter, 1985, 1980) – depict strategy [intuitively
referred to as ‘‘a plan,’’ often of a formal nature, that is to say, a detailed
listing of objectives and akin courses of action set to achieve the former
(Chandler, 1962)] as an important part of the general manager’s or chief
executive ofﬁcer’s toolkit, to deploy at will with the primary aim of
improving the ﬁnancial performance of the ﬁrm (or of corporate businesses)
and consequently enhance the likelihood of corporate survival or growth.
Strategy, one argues, revolves around the ‘‘most important’’ decisions
regarding ‘‘(y) the nature of the business in which a company is to engage
and the kind of company it is to be’’ (Learned, Christensen, Andrews, &
Guth, 1965, p. 9). The anatomy of corporate strategy (as part of individual
and collective commitments to the ﬁrm’s present and future) is tentatively
set out: ‘‘As the [evolving] outcome of the [never-ending and shared
strategy-making] decision process [presided over by executives] (y),
corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that (1) shapes
and reveals its [long-term] objectives, purposes, or goals, (2) produces the
principal policies and plans for achieving these goals, and (3) deﬁnes the
business the company intends to be in and the kind of economic and human
organization it intends to be’’ (Learned et al., 1965, p. 125).
Strategy as such articulated, meticulous plan results from a long-range or
strategic planning endeavor, that is, a time-consuming and carefully devised
analysis that normally includes market research, competitive intelligence,
and environmental surveillance. Top management devises a plan (or a plot)
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that is capable of dealing with the expected trends in customers,
competitors, and environmental forces and, most importantly, with the
potential impact of those entities and forces on the ﬁrm. A stated strategy
necessarily includes clear, long-term goals and objectives (e.g., reputation
and market share, respectively) and the timed actions by which these goals
and objectives are to be attained. Inasmuch as strategy is explicit, it conveys
‘‘(y) both what the company is trying to achieve and how it hopes to
achieve it’’ (Christensen, Berg, Salter, & Stevenson, 1951, p. 20). All in all,
corporate strategy is clearly rooted in means–ends relations, with the ends
being reduced to cut-throat competition of chosen products in selected
markets (Ansoff, 1965).
Strategy must be formulated in a way that ‘‘ﬁts’’ the uniqueness of the
ﬁrm regarding its environment; internal resources; managers’ preferences
and beliefs; and corporate–social responsibility (Uyterhoeven, Ackerman, &
Rosenblum, 1973). That is to say, strategy ought to be tailored to the
predicted evolution of opportunities and threats (e.g., posed by political,
economic, social, technological, and other environmental forces as well as
by the moves of competitors); to take advantage of the ﬁrm’s strengths and
mitigate its weaknesses, vis-a`-vis those of rivals; to account for the individual
idiosyncrasies (e.g., education, risk-taking propensity, ethical standards,
religious and political orthodoxies) shaping the ﬁrm’s purposes, decision
making, and conduct; and to provide what society as a whole expects from
it, beyond the pursuit of merely economic targets (e.g., proﬁt maximization
within the law). Corporate strategy thus results from matching what the ﬁrm
might do with what the ﬁrm can do, while being inﬂuenced or constrained,
to varying extents, by both what the ﬁrm wants to do and what the ﬁrm
should do. In short, opportunities and threats, strengths and weaknesses,
managerial values and ideals, and ethical or moral standards and social
obligations all impose, to varying extents, restrictions upon the strategy to
develop and adopt by the ﬁrm.
After strategy formulation, implementation follows suit. The general
manager is to make sure that that implementation is successfully carried out,
a task which is affected by the following: ﬁrst, the kind and extent of
leadership effected (and thus the capacity to elicit individual and group
cooperation and commitment to proposed targets within ethical customs
and other limits imposed to discretion, in spite of diverse interests and
expectations); second, the ﬁrm’s organizational structure (materialized in
the formal authority lines, communication channels, hierarchical levels, and
degree of empowerment, as well as the informal workings, arrangements,
and relationships prevailing); third, the information and performance
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evaluation and reward systems (ensuring that information is readily
available as input to a sound decision making and that both fair and
logical compensation or punishment ensue in accord with demonstrated
efforts and results and that monetary and immaterial incentives for future
performance are also provided); and fourth, the allocation of existing and
future resources (i.e., how, by whom, for how long, and why are resources to
be employed within the ﬁrm in the pursuit of declared targets).
This stance of strategy (as a tool at the ﬁrm’s disposal that enables it to
adapt to a faceless, fully competitive, and uncontrollable environment)
conﬁgures the so-called ‘‘strategy as ﬁt’’ view, that is to say, that strategy
allows the continuous match of the ﬁrm to the set of changing
environmental forces that affect it largely and over which it has no control
or inﬂuence (e.g., political, economic, social, and technological ones). The
ﬁrm searches a never-ending alignment between environmental opportu-
nities and threats and corporate strengths and weaknesses (Andrews, 1971).
Thus there exists an environment-led ﬁt and the ﬁrm only displays reactivity
(if not mere passivity), reacting to (or standing still when in face of )
external changes. In a nutshell, strategy is a means to an end, intentionally
devised via formal planning systems (often at the responsibility of the
top management team) and implemented at will by the ﬁrm, through the
deployment of internally developed and/or acquired resources (Ackoff,
1970).
Reigning orthodoxy among strategy scholars and researchers portrays the
ﬁrm – the main unit of analysis in strategic management’s research – as a
self-sufﬁcient entity obsessed with the obtainment and renewal of sustained
competitive advantages, that is, some sort of lasting advantages over direct
rivals (Christensen, 2001; Porter, 1987). The ﬁrm is an ‘‘autarchy’’ solely
focused on outmaneuvering ﬁerce competitors (e.g., via cost leadership or
differentiation) in an industry characterized by intensive rivalry, wherein
even suppliers and customers are threatening forces that need to be cope
with (Porter, 1979). In order to survive and grow in such cut-throat
competition, the ﬁrm has to strive for a ﬁt with its surrounding, composed
of a large number of (macro) environmental forces (e.g., political, legal,
economic, social, demographical, and technological ones). As Axelsson
(1992a) claims, the ‘‘dominant’’ perspective depicts the ﬁrm as atomistic,
struggling for survival in a hostile environment. Axelsson (1992a) identiﬁes
two other perspectives on the strategic management ﬁeld: the ‘‘emerging’’
and the ‘‘missing’’ perspectives that acknowledge, respectively, the existence
of pockets of interﬁrm cooperation (e.g., dyads, triads, and nets) (Astley,
1984; Astley & Fombrun, 1985) and the ubiquity of vertical cooperative
FILIPE J. SOUSA440
relationships between ﬁrms in the business world (Axelsson & Easton, 1992;
Hakansson & Snehota, 1995).
Bearing in mind the prevalence of interﬁrm cooperation in the business
world (Blois, 1972; Richardson, 1972) and, therefore, the notorious
embeddedness of the ﬁrm (Ben-Porath, 1980; Granovetter, 1985), some
scholars and researchers begin to challenge the above-mentioned dominant
(yet unrealistic) perspective on strategy by making contributions on a
‘‘relational’’ view of corporate strategy – a view that is in line with the works
of Hakansson and Snehota (2006, 1989), Normann and Ramirez (1993),
Wilkinson and Young (1994), Juttner and Schlange (1996), Ford et al.
(1998), Tikkanen and Halinen (2003), Ford and Mouzas (2007), and
Baraldi, Brennan, Harrison, Tunisini, and Zolkiewski (2007), and that
consubstantiates the missing perspective that Axelsson (1992a) alludes to.
Contrary to presumptions of the strategy ﬁeld doctrine, the relational view of
strategy admits that the ﬁrm’s conduct (and hence corporate strategy) is neither
determined by the environment nor completely autonomous. The networked
ﬁrm enjoys a considerable discretion, something in between total ‘‘strategic
choice’’ (Child, 1972) and ‘‘environmental determinism’’ (Aldrich, 1979).
Corporate strategy results not only from the incremental and coherent
decisions and actions taken by the ﬁrm over time (Mintzberg, 1987;
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Quinn, 1980) but also from counterparts’
decisions and actions. Strategy in the coopetitive business world is much
less competitive in focus, shifting from pursuing victory over counterparts to
somehow making it together with those entities. ‘‘Strategy in business
markets is not just about the company acting against others, but also often
acting with, or through them’’ (Ford et al., 1998, p. 274, emphasis in original).
The key message of the relational view of strategy is quite straightforward:
the ﬁrm is likely to survive or grow – with corporate survival and growth as
being ultimate purposes to which aspires – only by the continuous alignment
with its environment and especially by shaping its context (together
with counterparts and in part to own advantage). Most importantly, the
performance of the ﬁrm is affected by (and affects) the conduct and
performance of counterparts with which is directly as well as indirectly
connected via cooperative relationships (Araujo, Dubois, & Gadde, 2003).
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Adam Smith, Allyn Young, and George Richardson are precursors of
network thinking on B2B markets, being among the ﬁrst scholars who
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contend the need for – and the large beneﬁts resulting from – both
specialization and integration (in the form of cooperation). MAN theory
arose formally in the mid-1970s as a European full-ﬂedged reaction to the
prevailing American view of industrial marketing and purchasing activities,
and its dissemination proceeds mostly through books but also via journal
papers.
Largely descriptive, MAN theory posits the focal ﬁrm as an interdepen-
dent entity with blurred and changeable vertical boundaries, heavily
embedded in intricate networks of connected business relationships. These
vertical cooperative relationships exhibit in general a set of distinctive
features (e.g., informality, continuity, symmetry, complexity, adaptations,
coopetition, social interaction, and routinization). Owing to this elaborate
substance, business relationships are capable to perform a diversity of
functions (e.g., access, control, efﬁciency, innovation, stability, and
networking), thus allowing the ﬁrm to obtain beneﬁts in excess of sacriﬁces
(i.e., relationship value). Business networks are self-organizing and evolving
aggregates of (diversely connected) business relationships and ﬁrms, and are
unbounded, centerless, and somewhat opaque.
The ﬁrm is inserted in a full-faced, rapidly changing context that
includes all the entities with which develops and sustains some kind of
corporate linkage (i.e., suppliers, customers, suppliers’ suppliers, customers’
customers, and even competitors). Accordingly, corporate strategy is a
pattern of converging decisions and actions of the ﬁrm with a twofold
purpose: ﬁrst, the (mostly passive or reactive) ﬁt to a slowly changing, and
largely faceless and intractable environment; and the (primarily proactive)
interrelation with and shaping of context.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no extensive review of MAN theory
is yet provided in the literature on business networks – despite the relevance
of some works addressing the theory’s points of departure, analytical and
empirical pathways, and upcoming research avenues (e.g., Easton, 1992;
Easton & Araujo, 1989; Mattsson, 2004; McLoughlin & Horan, 2000a).
Although this paper arguably provides the major review of MAN theory
published so far, the author pleads for the update, revision, and even
extension of the integrative and synthesizing work tentatively done here.
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